The Japanese Empire: Grand Strategy from the Meiji Restoration to the Pacific War

Very interesting read. Big fan of this

A great book revealing the grand plan strategy of Japan for defending herself and her colonies. Great military and diplomatic details. Really enjoyed the wars presented and the complexity of the second sino japanese war must buy

Klasse auf den Punkt gebracht in gut verständlichem, elegantem Englisch. Die Korephäe auf dem Gebiet.

Excelente livro explicando a época da restauração Meiji e seus impactos na sociedade japonesa. Também explica os motivos que levaram o império do sucesso inicial para seu eclipse sangrento na segunda guerra mundial. Da uma visão geral sobre os motivos que levaram o Japão a entrar na segunda guerra

Authoratative and well written in a clear and informative style.

Sarah C. M. Paine, docente allo United States Naval College, offre in The Japanese Empire un affresco a volo d'uccello della storia politico-militare giapponese dalle cause della rivoluzione Meiji alla disfatta nell'estate 1945. L'autrice si concentra molto sulla guerra sino-giapponese (1894-95) e sul conflitto contro la Russia zarista (1904-05), che individua come pivotali nella strutturazione di una strategia nazionale che, tuttavia, soffre della divisione tra una visione "continentale" difesa dall'esercito e di una postura più "marittima" propugnata dalla marina imperiale. Paine sostiene che Tokyo non seppe decidersi su quale delle due prediligere, imboccando prima l'una e poi l'altra con il risultato di combattere guerre sovradimensionate rispetto le sue reali possibilità. Si tratta del caso della seconda guerra sino-giapponese (1937-45), il cui lungo incubare è del pari trattato, ma più sinteticamente rispetto a quanto fatto nei capitoli precedenti. Allo stesso modo, le ostilità contro le potenze occidentali sono esposte in un'agile riassunto. Di valore, a mio avviso, è l'apertura di cui gode quest'opera: l'autrice riporta operazioni militari, crimini di guerra, motivazioni economiche, ragioni politiche, azioni unilaterali delle forze armate; presenta brevemente anche alcune personalità cruciali nella storia imperiale nipponica; fornisce cifre su differenti voci (forze in campo, perdite, spese militari, indici di produzione e così via). Di buona qualità le mappe, inserite tra un capitolo e l'altro. Di sicuro è un libro eccellente per avvicinarsi, pur senza dettagliati approfondimenti, all'Impero giapponese pre-1945, stante anche il registro linguistico non criptico.

This book provides an excellent overview of the rise and fall of the Japanese Empire. The author analyzes why Japan, who was successful in two wars (First Sino-Japanese and Russo-Japanese) yet failed miserably in two later conflicts (Second Sino-Japanese and Pacific War against the USA). The picture painted is one of temporary success achieved by a modernizing group of leaders (Meiji Generation) who used all aspects of grand strategy (economic, foreign policy, social and military) to achieve the goal of making Japan not only fit into the arena of the Western dominated global system but also developed their country into a regional player as well. Their success, however, was fleeting as these men failed to institutionalize their new structure and Japan essentially reverted to their old bushido based society as the army, the most organized and effective organization, filled the void left by the Meiji Men. In their early wars, Japan emulated the Prussian model embodied by Otto von Bismarck who skillfully demonstrated what Clausewitz meant when he said war was politics by other means. Japanese leaders in the first two wars carefully crafted their goals and then used warfare (among other things) to bring their vision to fruition, In contrast, the later Japanese leaders (mid 1920’s onward) fell into the same trap as their future allies in Germany by relying solely on an military operational approach to achieve their goals, an approach that doomed them. For example, in the first two wars the Japanese leaders laid the foundation for an exit strategy even before the first shots were fired whereas later they made no effort to prepare for that eventual step of war termination. The author also spends a good deal of time comparing and contrasting continental versus maritime powers. This is useful not only for general knowledge and analyzing military conflicts throughout history, but it also becomes the bedrock of his critical point: Japan’s biggest failure was its attempt to become a continental power when geography clearly indicated their greatest chance of success and power lay in making themselves into a great maritime power. As one might expect this book is one of decision making and grand strategy so you will not find any in depth discussion of campaigns or battles except in how it reflected the strategy that Japan tried to execute that it mistakenly thought was grand strategy when in reality it was operationally based. Along with all this analysis Paine makes insightful observations regarding different aspects of the conflicts involved and helps the reader to see the situation in the same light as those who lived through this tumultuous time.. For examples, in his discussion regarding the US use of atomic bombs he writes “During the war, Americans did not feel angst over the enemy civilian death toll from the air war or even from the atomic bombs. They had lost too many of their own children and wanted a victory that minimized their own children’s deaths. Only from the security of a postwar world, no longer under threat of Imperial Japanese or Nazi German aggression, have subsequent generations criticized the air war.” The parallels he draws between Germany’s war with Russia and the Japanese war with China are also interesting as well. In the end, I highly recommend this book to anyone who wants to learn the basics about the Japanese Empire during this crucial period. The analysis of not only the Japanese decision making but also the principles of grand strategy and the fundamental differences of continental and maritime powers in their pursuit of security richly packs this quite pithy (187 pages) book.