The Tragedy of Great Power Politics

If you're interested in this, you are probably a political science or international relations student, which is a shame because very few general readers would pick this up, and it's those who need it the most, this really deserves to be a best-seller. I majored in biochemistry and am an indie game developer, never took a single class in political science, but on a friend's recommendation who was majoring in that I read this book, and I've re-read it several times over the years, and it's become one of my favorite books (certainly in my top 10 of nonfiction). Basically, this book presents an overarching theory of why wars exist, one that is precise enough to allow even uninformed readers to make predictable, and historically accurate, and precise predictions about when a country will go to war (and why). Most people believe wars to happen for one of several reasons -- "human nature" (because humans just like fighting and are inherently violent or stupid or something), or perhaps the war over religion and ideology, or perhaps over resources. I'd guess that almost everyone believes war happens for one of those reasons. This book dispels that notion very cleanly and completely. After you read it, you'll realize that nations go to war simply because they are afraid. They know that if they lose a war against a greater power, their nation is done for -- it will become occupied, or a puppet state, of a greater power, and lose whatever power they had. Nations do not want that to happen, they are terrified of being dominated by greater nations. And this is a systematic thing, no individual might consciously decide on this, but this is how all nations do seem to work: they are afraid of being conquered, so they go to war to make sure they are the one who conquer, not the one being conquered. This central notion that fear of being conquered by another nation, and not anything else, drives almost all war is the main thesis of the book, and it's argued for very convincingly, with a lot of historical examples. So, the first way a country can be certain it's not going to be conquered by its neighbors is to become the strongest power in its major landmass -- the regional hegemon. Most nations in a position to do so will try to gain regional power -- that is what China is doing in asia, that's what the US did the Americas, and that's what various european countries (e.g. England, France, the Dutch, the Germans, the Russians) have attempted to do for europe, and so on. By this thesis, it may seem counter-intuitive, but according to this idea, the reason Germany went to war was not because they were nationalistic or inherently violent, or because of the ideological differences between fascism, capitalism, and communism, or because wanted to purify Europe of undesirable races, or even that they were angry over the conditions imposed on them after WW1 (though that's part of it), but simply because Germany feared being conquered and wanted to become the most powerful nation in Europe to make sure they would survive. This is a *very* different understanding of war than most people have, I want to emphasize that again. And it sounds strange at first, but this book will probably convince you of it (as evidence, Germany in WW1 had a very different ideology, but the conditions were somewhat similar, and they still went to war, for the same reason they did go to war in WW2. Sometimes WW1 is blamed on entangling alliances or the assassination of an archduke, but, in reality, according to this theory, Germany went to war in WW1 for the exact same reason they want to war in WW2, because they saw an opportunity to become local hegemon of Europe, and took that opportunity). If you still aren't convinced, that isn't of course the job of this review, it's the job of the book; the number of examples used in the book far exceed would I could bring up here. And the author's writing is much better than mine in any case. I'm just trying to explain why I like the book: because it gives you a different opinion of war than the usual one, and does so very convincingly, through factual argument, and explains it in a simple to understand way (you don't need to have even taken a political science course to follow along with the argument).

John Mearshieimer presents an excellent theory in the form of offensive realism that stands up to close scrutiny in his book the Tragedy of Great Power Politics. By clearly laying out his definitions of what state goals are and how he measures power he makes a compelling case for regional hegemony and the stopping power of water. By utilizing several case studies to prove his theory the points are well made. His analysis of military power is very interesting and well done. It is hard to find good realist IR theory these days as so many people doubt that such a system is relevant in a post cold war world. Mearshiemer makes one of the better cases for it existing today and for categorizing the state of anarchy that exists in the world. He rightly recognizes that the potential for great power conflict is not likely in Europe and the Russia is to weak to invade there. His characterization of Asia is very strong and the possible conflict between China and the US is clearly analyzed and presented. My only criticisms and they were not enough to drop the book down a star was that Africa and the Middle East was virtually ignored. Resource conflict is a major potential area of violence in the future and much of this focused on technological or military threats leaving out the recent prospects of resource conflict. By looking at a regional system these areas should have been included. Overall though excellent realist theory and a very enjoyable read.

As Mearsheimer's theories several other reviewers here have discussed I just want to add a few points. I always have a reluctant to accept someone who makes a political theory that only has a limited place for individuals. However while Mearsheimer makes an extremely good case for his Offensive Realism, I found myself while reading though his examples a bit dubious over his explanations like Russia did not try to stay out of WW2 after the fall of France because she was trying to pass the buck. I think its because she was too weak to get involved in the conflict. Japan could have gone to war in 1941 against Russia rather then the US, in fact Mearsheimer's theories might suggest that Russia would have been a better target for them after all Russia was weak and their main rival in the region. At the end of WW2, the US with its forces in Europe would have been a hegemonic power there. Why did she not go for Eastern Europe too and why did she allow European powers to become independent? It controlled Japan too, why give that up? Mearsheimer's himself admits having problems in explaining why Germany did not go to war in 1905 against France when his theories suggested that they should have. The other issue is that this book states the system does not matter but what the rulers are interested in which is a relative advantages over their rivals. Well democratic societies, the electorate makes it quite clear it want *absolute* improvement in their living standards every year. If a leader of the US was to reduce the living standards of the US by reducing the living standards of China (as I think the writer suggests) I doubt the US voters would be pleased with their drop in living standards. If for example the US conquered Mexico then it would in the long term have made the Mexicans citizens, they would have voted, large sums of money would have gone into Mexico etc. The former US electorate would be upset as it sees large sums of money of its money going South. We can see such a situation actually occurring with Turkey attempts to join the EC. The rich states of EC don't want this drain in their living standards. Also democratic societies electorates although they are prepared for a war, generally they want peace and will demand that they get it eg the Japanese electorate in the 1920s made the Japanese troops come back from its invasion of Eastern Russia, as did the US electorate in Vietnam and the Israel electorate in Lebanon. Both the Israeli and US electorates, are looking at the X of their troops that are getting killed not the 5*X terrorist that they are killing. In both, we can see that the electorate is saying lets get the troops to safety as soon as we can and a democratic leader that does not do so will find himself out soon.

This was one hell of a book. John Mearshimer is widely debated among international relations scholars, and even those who dislike him often have to contend that he's been deeply influential. In "The Tragedy of Great Power Politics" he makes the case for what he calls Offensive Realism, a theoretical framework for understanding how powerful nations have peacefully and military interacted throughout history - and how they will continue to in the future. In it, he unpacks numerous dense historical examples, compares the results against his theory and those of more traditional realist thought as well as liberal international relations theory, and attempts to make predictions about the future of relations between China and the United States. Nearly a decade old, the book has already made some unsettlingly accurate predictions about the course of the relationship. For those looking to understand why states like Russia may have chosen to bumble into Ukraine, why China may try to take Taiwan, or why the United States intervenes in so many far flung places, it's a vital read.

Fantastic book, written in a simple to read language and truly informative. I’m going to read more of his books, he is an inspiration.

This is not a book about all wars or about how policy works on the global stage in general. Instead, this is a book about how great powers deal with each other. Moreover, this is a book intended to make a case for offensive realism and how it serves as the best worldview in policy development between superpowers. The book begins by explaining the prevailing worldviews such as liberalism (not in the American political context, but in relation to global politics) and other forms of realism before stating his point of view regarding offensive realism. He does not vacillate back and forth between these views showing why his is superior to the others, but he does provide a wealth of other reading in his extensive footnotes to provide the reader with trails to follow for opposing opinions. He uses historical evidence from the French Revolution to present day, focusing on major power struggles rather than "small wars" like the Persian Gulf War or Vietnam Conflict, because these are not the focus of the book. (Again, the focus is on superpowers and how they vie for power on the global stage.) This book is superbly organized, and it is extremely easy to read because of its organization. First, Mearsheimer tells you vaguely what his chapter is going to discuss, then he discusses it in clear detail with historical evidence to back his claim, and then he summarizes. In the introduction, Mearsheimer outlines the points he plans to make in his book, and refers to them throughout. This text is highly recommended for those interested in global politics and policy development. Reading this text makes much of what has been done over the decades make more sense. He makes a very solid case for offensive realism.

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The central tenet in Mearsheimer's work, establishing the concept of offensive realism, is that the ultimate end-goal in the world today is global hegemony. Mearsheimer does a superb job at reinforcing this as his premise, using historical circumstance in abundance to detail cases where nations have pushed for such hegemony. In this respect, Mearsheimer argues that the growing confrontation with China will be caused because the United States cannot allow any nation to challenge its status as a hegemon. The author argues that the United States is the global hegemon of this time, able to project its power anywhere (via advanced technology and aircraft carriers). That being said, with such dominance, the United States, according to Mearsheimer, benefits in that no nation has established itself as a regional hegemon. Thus comes the conflict with China. As Chinese power grows, Mearsheimer argues that the United States must work to constrain such power, particularly through establishing India, Japan, and Korea as a barrier to Chinese hegemony. The same can be compared to Brazilian power growth in South America. All in all, this seems to be well on its way to become a standard in neo-realist theory, with all the pros and cons that come along with such a label. Because of Mearsheimer's use of history and example, however, I would recommend this as a starting point for modern theory along with, of course, Waltz and Morgenthau. As with most neo-realist texts, however, this has as a negative in that it has a systematic bias against world organizations, cooperations, and other instruments of global power. Worth the read.

Pourquoi les grandes puissances recherchent-elle l'hégémonie, la guerre étant l'un des moyens d'y parvenir? Mearsheimer répond à cette question par cet opus assez court, très clair et facile à lire (en anglais). L'ouvrage décrit très bien les éléments que l'on retrouve dans la confrontation actuelle entre l'occident et la Russie ou la Chine. Ecrit il y a une vingtaine d'années, il est même, hélas, véritablement prophétique.

This book provides crucial historical information that has been grounded in theoretical principles and that is what I like about it. I uses it as academic reference source in my international relations studies.

No frills analysis of great powers relationships over the last two centuries. Perfectly current. Must read.

Llegó impecable.

This is the seminal book on international relations in which Prof. Mearsheimer develops his theory of offensive realism. It provides an invaluable guide for making sense of the multipolar world order that has emerged within the past decade.